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VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS IN AIRLINE RULES TARIFFS
John T. Plunket*
NTERSTATE common carriers are required by statute to file
with the federal agency which regulates their activities tariffs
setting forth the rates, fares and charges which the carrier intends
to collect from persons using its services and the related rules,
regulations and conditions under which those services will be pro-
vided. In the case of railroads and pipe lines,' motor carriers'
and water carriers,' the agency is the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and with regard to radio and telegraph companies,4 it
is the Federal Communications Commission. Carriers by air must,
*A.B., LL.B., University of Texas; member of the Texas Bar; Legal Counsel, Braniff
Airways, Inc., Dallas, Texas.
49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 6 (1):
Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter shall file with
the commission created by this chapter and print and keep open to public inspec-
tion schedules showing all the rates, fares, and charges for transportation between
different points on its own route and between points on its own route and points
on the route of any other carrier by railroad, by pipe line, or by water when a
through route and joint rate have been established. If no joint rate over the
through route has been established, the several carriers in such through route
shall file, print and keep open to public inspection as aforesaid, the separately
established rates, fares and charges applied to the through transportation. The
schedules printed as aforesaid by any such common carrier shall plainly state the
places between which property and passengers will be carried, and shall contain
the classification of freight in force, and shall also state separately all terminal
charges, storage charges, icing charges, and all other charges which the commis-
sion may require, all privileges or facilities granted or allowed and any rules
or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the
aggregate of such aforesaid rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service
rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee. Such schedules shall be plainly
printed in large type, and copies for the use of the public shall be kept posted
in two public and conspicuous places in every depot, station, or office of such
carrier where passengers or freight, respectively, are received for transportation,
in such form that they shall be accessible to the public and can be conveniently
inspected. The provisions of this section shall apply to all traffic, transportation,
and facilities defined in this chapter.
249 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 317 (a).
349 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 906 (a).
448 STAT. 1070 (1934), 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 203.
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pursuant to Section 403 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act,5 file
tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
It has long been held that the "schedules" or "tariffs" so filed
become a part of the contract between the carrier and its passen-
gers, shippers or customers and, as such, are binding on both
parties to such contract.6 Thus the public is assured of uniform
treatment by the common carrier, and the evils of favoritism, re-
bates and "special contracts" are avoided.
Nor is it necessary that the passenger, shipper or customer
have actual knowledge of the contents of the carrier's tariffs in
order that those provisions be binding upon him. Their filing with
the appropriate regulatory agency puts the public upon notice
as to the terms under which the carrier will provide services. Thus,
in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co.,' a cable
message was filed in Spain with a telegraph company upon a form
which did not indicate that the service was in any way subject to
defendant's tariff. However, the error in transmission which gave
rise to the lawsuit occurred on defendant's lines, and the United
States Supreme Court held that defendant's tariffs stated the terms
of the contract and governed the company's liability.
5 52 STAT. 992 (1938), 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 483:
(a) Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the Board,
and print, and keep open to public inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares,
and charges for air transportation between points served by it, and between points
served by it and points served by any other air carrier or foreign air carrier when
through service and through rates shall have been established, and showing to
the extent required by regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules, regula-
tions, practices, and services in connection with such air transportation. Tariffs
shall be filed, posted, and published in such form and manner, and shall contain
such information, as the Board shall by regulation prescribe; and the Board is
empowered to reject any tariff so filed which is not consistent with this section
and such regulations. Any tariff so rejected shall be void. The rates, fares, and
charges shown in any tariff shall be stated in terms of lawful money of the United
States, but such tariffs may also state rates, fares, and charges in terms of cur-
rencies other than lawful money of the United States, and may, in the case of
foreign air transportation, contain such information as may be required under the
laws of any country in or to which an air carrier or foreign air carrier is authorized
to operate.
1 Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 (1914) ; Kansas City Southern Ry.
v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639 (1913).
7256 U. S. 566 (1921).
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Carriers have long followed the practice of referring on tickets
or waybills to these tariffs for a statement of the contract of car-
riage which they offer the public. Koontz v. South Suburban Safe-
way Lines' states the reason:
Because of the fact that the tariff regulations filed with the Com-
mission are of an intricate and complex nature, it is manifestly im-
possible to imprint on tickets all of the rules and regulations of the
tariffs. These rules and regulations are nevertheless binding upon the
carrier and the passenger. The carrier may not lawfully deviate from
its filed tariffs. It cannot obligate itself to deviate from the rates and
conditions of the tariffs. To permit a carrier to do so would open the
door to discrimination.
So, on the back of the tickets issued by the scheduled air car-
riers of the United States are certain "Conditions of Transporta-
tion" or, as sometimes labeled, a "Contract of Carriage." One of
the provisions contained therein is to the effect that the transpor-
tation is furnished subject to the provisions of the carrier's tariffs.
Similarly, the air waybill under which freight is carried refers
the shipper and consignee to the carrier's tariffs for a full state-
ment of the transportation contract.
Each carrier has filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board a pas-
senger tariff and a freight tariff, or is a "participating carrier"
in tariffs filed with that agency by an industry association.9 Each
tariff consists of a "rates tariff" and a "rules tariff." The latter
contains rules, regulations and practices under which the carrier
will provide transportation at the rates specified in the former.
These include provisions dealing with the applicability of fares,
rates and charges, the routing and re-routing of passengers, the
making and cancelling of reservations, ticketing and the validity
of tickets and the handling of baggage, and certain provisions
limiting or affecting the liability of the carrier in such matters as
8 332 fli. App. 14, 73 N. E. 2d 919, 920 (1947).
9 Currently, the principal industry association tariffs are Local and Joint Passenger
Rules Tariff No. PR-3, C. A. B. No. 27, and Local and Joint Passenger Fares Tariff No.
PF-4, C. A. B. No. 18, both issued by C. C. Hubbard, Agent; Official Airfreight Rules
Tariff No. 1, C. A. B. No. 1, and Official Airfreight Rate Tariff No. 2, C. A. B. No. 8, both
issued by Emery F. Johnson, Agent.
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loss or damage to baggage, failure to operate on schedule, can-
cellation of flights, failure to transport freight promptly, etc.
The public is protected against improper, unfair, unreasonable
or discriminatory rates, fares, rules or regulations by the fact that
the regulatory agency may refuse to permit the filing of any rates
or rules which it considers improper, and may cancel any which
it subsequently finds to be improper and dictate a satisfactory re-
placement. Thus, Section 1002 (d) of the Civil Aeronautics Act"
provides that if, following complaint by any person or upon its
own initiative, the Board is of the opinion that any rate, fare or
charge demanded or collected by a carrier "or any classification,
rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare or charge, or
the value of the services thereunder, is or will be unjust or unrea-
sonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential, or
unduly prejudicial" the Board shall prescribe the lawful rate,
fare or charge "or the lawful classification, rule, regulation or
practice thereafter to be made effective."
Under these circumstances the validity of these rules is nat-
urally an important question in any litigation growing out of
transportation furnished by the carrier filing them. Following the
doctrine of the Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker"l and Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve cases, the courts have held that, to
the extent that they are valid, the rules in air carrier tariffs do
become a part of the contract of carriage. It also seems well set-
tled that, under the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine, it is the regu-
latory agency - presumably expert in such matters - which is
to determine the question of the "reasonableness" of such rules,
provided the subject matter is within the jurisdiction established
by statute for the agency.
Thus, in Jones v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,' 2 the Supreme Court
of Washington held: "In buying this ticket, appellant bought it
subject to the regulations. Respondent could not sell it on any
1052 STAT. 1018 (1938), 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 642 (d).
11233 U. S. 97 (1914), cited supra note 6.
12 22 Wash. 2d 863, 157 P. 2d 728, 729 (1945).
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other basis without violating the law, for section 483 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act, 49 U. S. C., requires the filing of these rules
and regulations and forbids a carrier from departing thereform."
The court then asserted, "If there be a question of this practice
being wrongful, it should be settled by the civil aeronautics board,
which exists for the very purpose of deciding such a matter."
And in Lichten v. Eastern Airlines8 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held: "Under these provisions, and similar
provisions of other enactments, it is well settled that questions of
the reasonableness of rates and practices are to be left to the
administrative agency in the first instance, and that under the
doctrine of 'primary jurisdiction' the provisions of a tariff prop-
erly filed with the Board and within its authority are deemed valid
until rejected by it."
Civil Aeronautics Board v. Modern Air Transport,4 cited in the
Lichten case as authority for the foregoing quotation, pointed out
that the courts will not determine a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal if the question is one
which requires the special knowledge and experience of the
administrative tribunal, and that this doctrine has been used by
the courts as a basis for refusing to decide the "difficult issues of
reasonableness of a rate or fairness of a regulation," the agency
being said to have "primary jurisdiction" in these matters. But
the court pointed out that this doctrine is not applicable where
the issue is not the reasonableness of the rate or rule, but whether
such rate or rule has been violated.
During the fifteen years since the enactment of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, surprisingly few judicial opinions have dealt with
the provisions of tariffs filed under Section 403(a). With the
growth of the air transport industry, however, they have become
more frequent, and recent developments with regard to them are
rather confusing.
is 189 F. 2d 939, 941 (1951).
14 179 F. 2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1950).
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A review of the cases which have been decided, grouped in
accordance with the rules with which they have been concerned,
will be helpful background.
CANCELLATION OF FLIGHTS
In Jones v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, the flight on which
plaintiff was a passenger was cancelled because of weather condi-
tions prior to reaching his destination. His suit was based on the
proposition that he had advised the carrier of the limited time
available to him for the trip and had been assured that "he would
get through all right," that he thereby had a special contract in
which his limited time had been provided for, and that accord-
ingly the carrier should have removed passengers from other
flights in order to provide him with transportation.
Printed on the passenger's ticket were the words "Sold subject
to tariff regulations," and the tariff which the carrier had filed
under Section 403(a) reserved to it the right to "cancel any
flight... at any.., point.., at any time it deems such action
advisable or necessary." Using the language heretofore quoted,
the court held that the carrier was exercising a contractual right
in cancelling the flight, and that the passenger could have no
"special contract" in view of the existence of the tariff rule.
The facts were similar in Mack v. Eastern Air Lines. 5 Plaintiff
was a passenger on an airplane bound from Boston to Washing-
ton when his flight was cancelled on arrival at New York because
of weather conditions in Washington. He based his suit on three
asserted causes of action: (1) tort, in that defendant negligently
failed to advise him that the flight to Washington might not be
completed and negligently failed to carry him beyond New York;
(2) tort, in that defendant negligently failed to complete the air
passage to Washington; and (3) contract, alleging breach of con-
tract to carry plaintiff to Washington.
15 87 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1949).
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The court pointed out that the carrier had filed a tariff under
Section 403, and that the tariff itself specified that the rules con-
tained therein "shall constitute the terms and conditions upon
which each participating carrier furnishes, or agrees to furnish,
transportation at such fares and charges, to the same extent as
if such Rules were included as terms and conditions in the con-
tract of carriage and expressly agreed to by the passengers." Quo-
tation from the rules in the tariff revealed that the carrier had
provided therein that it should not "be liable for failing to operate
any flight according to schedule or for changing the schedule of
any flight with or without notice to the passenger" and that it
might "refuse to transport, or to remove at any point, any passen-
ger-(1) Whenever such action is necessary to comply with any
governmental regulation, or whenever it deems such action neces-
sary or advisable by reason of weather or other conditions beyond
its control."
Under these circumstances, the court held that there could "be
no question that these Rules were within the authority conferred
by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and became part of the con-
tract between the carrier and the passenger" and that "[i] nasmuch
as the Rules 11, 14 and 15 of the Rules Tariff were incorporated
in the contract between plaintiff and defendant, there can be no
question that plaintiff is bound by the conditions specified there-
in." As authority the court cited Jones v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker and Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Esteve. 7
16 Id. at 115.
17 In Adler v. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 41 F. Supp. 366 (E. D. Mo. 1941), the
court considered a suit based on cancellation of the flight on which plaintiff passenger
held reservations. While making no reference to tariffs, the court ruled that under the
"primary jurisdiction" doctrine it had no power to act until administrative remedies were
exhausted. "It is apparent that the practice of the defendant of cancelling scheduled
flights is a 'practice' within the meaning of the Civil Aeronautics Act .... It follows that
the reasonableness or lawfulness of such practice can only be determined by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, and this court is without any jurisdiction to grant any relief to the
plaintiff in the absence of a finding by that board that the practice complained of is un-
lawful or unreasonable, and until the plaintiff is able to allege in a complaint that he
has exhausted all of his remedies before that board." Id. at 367.
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TIME OF DELIVERY OF FREIGHT
The only published opinion dealing with rules published in an
air freight tariff seems to be that in Furrow & Co. v. American
Airlines, Inc."8 A shipment of flowers was found to be wilted on
delivery to the consignee, and plaintiff sought damages for delay
in shipment. The court found, however, that the shipment arrived
within a reasonable time, and pointed out that the carrier's tariff
contained provisions that freight was accepted subject to avail-
ability of space, that the carrier reserved the right to decide the
priority of shipment and which shipments would move on a par-
ticular flight and that the carrier did not agree to transport within
any specific time and was not to be held liable for failure to do
so. Citing the Jones and Mack cases, supra, the court held: "Such
rules are within the authority conferred by the Civil Aeronautics
Act, and the tariffs involved became a part of the contract of
transportation."19
DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY FOR Loss OF CERTAIN
TYPES OF BAGGAGE
The highest authority to date on the question of the validity of
air carrier tariff provisions is the Lichten case, cited above. Here
the complaint was that the plaintiff, as a Miami-Philadelphia
passenger, had checked two pieces of baggage before boarding
the flight, that one of them was not removed from the airplane at
Philadelphia but was carried to Newark where it was delivered by
mistake to an unknown person, and was subsequently recovered
by the carrier and delivered to the passenger. Investigation then
revealed that some $3,000 worth of jewelry was missing from
the bag.
The defense was based upon rules contained in a tariff filed
under Section 403(a) which provided (1) that jewelry "will be
18 102 F. Supp. 808 (W. D. Okla. 1952).
i Id. at 809.
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carried only at the risk of the passenger" and (2) that the car-
rier should not be liable for the loss of jewelry included in a
passenger's baggage. The court noted that "[t]o the extent that
these rules are valid, they became a part of the contract under
which the appellant and her baggage were carried," citing the
Esteve and Mack cases,2" and then passed to a consideration of the
validity of the provisions.
L
Noting Section 1002 (a), (d) and (g) of the Act,2 and that
under the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine the provisions of a
tariff properly filed with the Board and within its authority are
deemed valid until rejected by it, the court commented that if the
Act be construed as empowering the Board to approve and accept
the tariff provisions in question, then the reasonableness of the rule
could be raised in court only after the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. Plaintiff, however, took the position that the Act
should not be construed to permit the Board to modify the com-
mon law rule that a common carrier may not by contract relieve
itself of the consequences of its own negligence and that the
common law rule invalidated the tariff provisions, regardless of
CAB action.
The court did not agree. Referring to the similarity of the Act
and the Interstate Commerce Act, the court observed that the lat-
ter, in the Carmack Amendment, expressly prohibited exemption
from liability for any loss or damage to baggage caused by the
carrier, regardless of negligence, 2 and reasoned that the "absence
of a similar provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act compels the
conclusion that such an exemption is not forbidden to air carriers,
and that the Board could properly accept the appellee's tariff.
28
Judge Frank, in a lengthy dissenting opinion, agreed that since
the tariff involved was filed with the Board, the Board must be
20 189 F. 2d at 940.
2152 STAT. 1018 (1938), 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 642 (a), (d), (g).
22 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 20 (11).
28 189 F. 2d at 941.
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deemed to have approved the provision in the absence of any
showing that it had rejected it. He argued, however, that the Board
had no power to approve such a provision, and that the Carmack
Amendment, far from creating a new rule of law, merely legis-
lated existing federal common law into a rule which would be
binding on state as well as federal courts - in other words, that
even prior to the enactment of the Carmack Amendment, such an
exemption of the carrier from liability for its own negligence
would have been invalid under the federal common law - and
that accordingly the inclusion of the Carmack Amendment in the
one Act was of no assistance in interpreting the other. He asserted
that if the Erie-Tompkins doctrine24 were applied, the law of the
State of New York would prohibit such a contractual provision,
and that, even if it were held that Erie-Tompkins did not apply
on the theory that Congress, by legislating on the subject, intended
that uniform rules should govern interstate air carriage, still "it
is inconceivable that Congress intended, merely by remaining
silent, to authorize the Board to adopt a policy flatly at odds
with the hitherto uniform Federal policy.... ,,"
Judge Frank acknowledged, however, that "[d]efendant, with
the Board's acquiescence, might have provided in its tariff (a)
perhaps that it would not carry jewelry at all, or, (b) possibly,
that its liability for any and all items contained in passengers'
baggage would be limited to a certain, reasonable amount, unless
the passenger gave notice of the presence of valuables in his bag-
gage and paid an additional sum for its transportation."26
With regard to the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine, he asserted
that, since in his view the provision in question was one which the
Board had no legal power to approve in the first place, there was
no necessity for determination by the administrative agency of the
validity of its own action, but that the plaintiff might proceed
directly to court.
24 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
25 189 F. 2d at 944.
2 6 d. at 945.
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REQUIREMENT OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF CLAIM WITHIN
SPECIFIED PERIOD
This rule seems to have been the subject of more controversy
than all of the others in the tariff combined. Typically, the rule
provides that no action shall be maintained against the carrier for
personal injury, death, or loss of or damage to baggage unless
written notice of the claim is given to the carrier within a specified
period - varying from 30 to 90 days - after the occurrence of
the event giving rise to the claim, and unless suit be filed within
a certain period - usually one year - after the same occurrence.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that such a
provision in a contract of carriage is valid, but there is a pro-
nounced difference of opinion as to whether including it in a tariff
filed with the CAB makes it a part of the contract of carriage.
The Supreme Court case is Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,"7
the opinion having been written by Justice Holmes in 1922. To
get a "drover's pass" - which provided him with transportation
to accompany a shipment of cattle - plaintiff agreed that the car-
rier would have no liability for personal injury unless he gave
notice to the railroad within 30 days after the occurrence of the
injury. This agreement was "required" by a provision of the tariff
which defendant had on file with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, but plaintiff actually signed a written stipulation to this
effect. Asserting that "actual knowledge on the part of the em-
ployees of the company was not an excuse for omitting the notice
in writing," Holmes went on to discuss the contention that a
statutory prohibition against requiring notice of claim within less
than 90 days after damage to goods had established a public
policy which would make the present provision improper:
We are satisfied, however, that in this case the requirement was
valid and that the statute referred to should not affect what in our
opinion would be the law apart from it. The decisions we have cited
27 258 U. S. 22.
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show that the time would have been sufficient, but for the statute, in re-
spect of damage to goods, and the reasons are stronger to uphold it as
adequate for personal injuries. A record is kept of goods, yet even as
to them reasonably prompt notice is necessary as a check upon fraud.
There is no record of passengers, and the practice of fraud is too
common to be ignored. Less time reasonably may be allowed for a
notice of claims for personal injuries than is deemed proper for goods,
although very probably an exception might be implied if the accident
made notice within the time impracticable .... 2
Similar provisions have also been upheld as reasonable in con-
tracts for carriage by water" and by air.80
The first case' considering the validity of such a provision
in a tariff filed with the CAB seems to have been Wilhelmy
v. Northwest Airlines,82 decided September 8, 1949, by the Fed-
eral District Court for the Western District of Washington. After
noting that similar provisions in transportation contracts of both
air and surface carriers had been held valid, the court followed
the Jones case8" in holding that the language, "Sold subject to
tariff regulations," printed on the passenger's ticket, charged the
passenger with notice of such regulations including the one in
question here. The court did not go into the "primary jurisdic-
tion" question, but announced specifically, "In the case at bar, this
Court holds that the thirty-day written notice of claim require-
ment and the one-year limit for commencing suit provision in the
transportation contract here in suit are reasonable and valid."8
And in a case decided in June, 1951, Herman v. Capital Air-
lines,5 the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York
25 Id. at 24, 25.
29 The Finland, 35 F. 2d 47 (E. D. N. Y. 1929).
80 Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S. D. N. Y.
1944) ; Sheldon v. Pan American Airways, 190 Misc. 537, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 578 (1947).
31 In State of Maryland v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 909 (S. D. N. Y. 1948),
the court denied a motion to strike a defense plea that plaintiff failed to file the notice
of claim within 90 days as required by the carrier's tariff, but the court did not discuss
the reasons for its ruling.
32 86 F. Supp. 565.
83 Discussed at note 12 supra.
84 86 F. Supp. at 567, 568.
85 104 F. Supp. 955.
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reached the same conclusion largely on the basis of the "primary
jurisdiction" doctrine and the authority of the Lichten case. The
court also rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the notice
requirement should not apply because she did not know the full
extent of her injuries until shortly before she started the action.
Then in four cases decided in 1952 the same provision was
rejected by federal district courts in Florida, Arkansas, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Missouri. The Florida court"6 did not indi.
cate the reason for its holding, but the other three relied largely
on Pacific Steamship Co. v. Cackette"
In the Cackette case the tariff, which required notice of claim
within ten days after occurrence of the injury, was filed under
Section 18 of the Shipping Act, which, said the court, "contains
no provision relating to the limitation of time for the presenta-
tion of claims." Quoting the Hooker case, the court concluded:
The clear purport of the [Hooker] decision is that a passenger or
shipper is not chargeable with notice of any regulation filed and pub-
lished which is not contemplated or required by the Interstate Com-
merce Act or the Amendments thereto .... A tariff is ordinarily under-
stood to be a system of rates and charges. The public, in dealing with
a common carrier, are bound to take notice that it has filed a tariff of
rates and charges, and are chargeable with notice of everything that is
properly included in or related to such system of rates and charges.
Rates for passenger transportation may be, as the court found in the
Hooker Case, directly affected by the degree of the carrier's responsi-
bility for safe carriage and delivery of baggage. No provision is found
in the Interstate Commerce Act which relates to rights of action against
carriers for damage or injuries from negligence or assault. Notice of
claims for such damages has no perceptible relation to rates and
charges for transportation. 8
In the Wilhelmy case the court considered Cackette but took the
view that the court's ruling had been based on a finding that the
ten-day period was unreasonably short, and the court held spe-
81 Glenn v. Cia. Cubana de Aviaci6n, 102 F. Supp. 631 (S. D. Fla. 1952).87 8 F. 2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925).
38 Id. at 260, 261.
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cifically that the thirty-day period involved in its own case was
reasonable. In Thomas v. American Airlines, 9 however, the court
cited Cackette as authority for the proposition that such limitation
periods are binding "only if there is statutory authority for filing
such tariff, that is, the statute controlling requires its filing," and
then found that the Civil Aeronautics Act did not require or auth-
orize the filing of tariff rules which limit the liability of the carrier
for personal injury resulting from its own negligence.
The District of Columbia court" also based its ruling on the
Cackette case. As it stated the rule: "with respect to rates or mat-
ters affecting rates, the character of services to be performed,
practices relating to the services to be rendered and matters re-
quired by ... [the Act] or by regulation promulgated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board pursuant to said Act, the tariff regulations do
as a matter of law control the carrier and the passenger or shipper,
and this without any actual notice or knowledge other than the
constructive notice afforded by the filing of such tariffs so re-
quired," but, "[w] here a tariff provision is gratuitously inserted
with respect to a matter other than that contemplated or required
by the Act of Congress or the regulations made pursuant thereto,
a passenger or shipper is not chargeable with notice as a matter
of law with respect thereto."
On the question of whether acceptance of a ticket bearing the
quoted provisions constituted an agreement between plaintiff and
defendant, the court, while recognizing that such contracts have
been upheld - citing the Gooch case" - took the position that
such a provision must "be distinctly declared and deliberately
accepted." Pointing out that the provision in the Gooch case was
set out in a written agreement signed by Gooch, the court decided
that a tariff provision is not sufficient.
30 104 F. Supp. 650 (E. D. Ark. 1952).
40 Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. D. C. 1952).
41 Discussed at note 27 supra.
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In the Missouri case42 the court quoted the language of Sections
403 and 404 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, emphasizing that rules,
regulations and practices may be included in tariffs "to the
extent required by regulations of the Board," and then asserted
that the Board's regulations did not refer to the filing of this pro-
vision. The court also questioned whether the Board would have
the power to approve such a provision unless specifically author-
ized by statute.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has now considered such a rule
in a proceeding brought by plaintiffs who had encountered the
"primary jurisdiction" rule in the judicial proceeding which they
instituted. While the Board's decision probably accomplishes jus-
tice in the particular case, its language raises more questions
than it settles.
The case in question is Continental Charters, Inc. - Complaint
of Mary Battista et al." Plaintiff's suit grew out of an accident
in which 26 passengers were killed and 14 injured. Defendant
carrier moved to dismiss the suit because plaintiff had not com-
plied with a tariff rule requiring notice of claim within 30 days
after the event. Under the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine the
court postponed further hearings to give plaintiff an opportunity
to seek a finding from the Board as to the lawfulness of the rule.
The Board stated that two questions were raised by the proceed-
ing before it: "(1) whether the rule in question was properly
included in the Respondent's tariff as required or authorized by
section 403 of the Act and the Board's regulations thereunder;
and (2) if so, was the rule reasonable." However, since it found
the rule to be unreasonable, the Board specifically did not pass
on the first question.
42 Toman v. Mid-Continent Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 345 (W. D. Mo. 1952).
43 C. A. B. Docket No. 5573 (Order Serial No. E-7087), 2 CCH Aviation L. Rep.
9 21,562, decided January 16, 1953.
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The Board asserted that the rule was not reasonably necessary
for the carrier's protection because such rules are not generally
found in the tariffs of carriers in other forms of transportation,
because it is inconceivable that an air carrier would not know of
a major accident to one of its airplanes, because stewardesses on
the airplanes are charged with the duty of noting and reporting
all injuries, and because passenger lists are maintained by the
carriers. The Board also found that the rule had always been
unreasonable, and that consequently it was unlawful and ineffec-
tive from its inception.
Thus, one court (Herman v. Capital Airlines) has held that the
Board must pass on the reasonableness of the rule, three others
(Thomas v. American Airlines, Shortley v. Northwestern Air-
lines,"" Toman v. Mid-Continent Airlines45 ) have held that there
is no statutory basis for filing the rule and hence it is ineffective,
one court (Wilhemy v. Northwest Airlines) has held that a thirty-
day notice period is reasonable, and another (Glenn v. Cia.
Cubana de Aviacion46) apparently held it is not reasonable. The
Board, when a plaintiff who had encountered the "primary juris-
diction" doctrine finally took the question to it, by-passed the
question of whether the rule was properly included in the tariff,
and held that the thirty-day provision is and always has been
unreasonable and consequently of no effect.
It is submitted that the Board's decision in the Continental
Charters case is open to question on two counts. In the first place,
the Supreme Court in the Gooch case held that a thirty-day notice
provision in a railroad passenger transportation contract is rea-
sonable and valid, and that the fact that the carrier's employees
had actual knowledge of the injury did not excuse the requirement
of notice. If, therefore, the provision in the Continental Charters
tariff was properly filed and hence did become a part of the trans-
44 Discussed at note 40 supra.
45 Discussed at note 42 supra.
46 Discussed at note 36 supra.
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portation contract, the Board's reasons for its holding seem nega-
tived by higher authority.
It is true that an air carrier would know of a major accident
to one of its airplanes, but it is also true that such carriers are
sued because of injuries allegedly incurred on a flight which oper-
ated without incident and without the stewardess' or other passen-
gers' having reported or being able to remember anything unusual
when asked about claimant's allegations a year or more later.
More troublesome, perhaps, is the effect of such a ruling by
the Board upon past events. Judge Frank in the Lichten case
reasoned:
Perhaps, indeed, the case at bar would not be a proper case for
advance administrative determination, even if it involved merely the
reasonableness of the Board's action in approving this exculpatory
provision. For, unlike the Interstate Commerce Act or the Shipping Act,
the Civil Aeronautics Act confers no power on any administrative body
to grant reparations for past misconduct of an air carrier. 49 U. S. C. A.
§ 642, on which my colleagues rely, authorizes a proceeding before the
Board which may terminate in an order looking solely to the future,
not to past conduct: The Board, under subsection (d), may determine
that a classification or practice shall not "thereafter" be effective; it
may, under subsection (f), make an order that an air carrier "discon-
tinue" a classification or practice; it may, under subsection (g), "sus-
pend" the operation of a classification or practice. In Public Utilities
Commission v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456, S. Ct. 369, 87 L.
Ed. 396, the Court construed a state statute, worded almost the same
as § 642, to authorize prospective action only, and to preclude retro-
active action. Consequently, were the plaintiff in this case to complain
to the Board, it could do no more than to order the defendant to dis-
continue the use of the exemption provision.4 7
But the Board, in the Continental Charters case, found that the
rule in question had always been ineffective because it was unlaw-
ful, saying: "We are quite satisfied that we do possess the requisite
authority to make an administrative finding of past unlawfulness
of the tariff rule under consideration."
4 189 F. 2d at 947, 948.
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If the Board is correct in its understanding of its powers in this
regard, then presumably neither carrier nor customer can be sure
as to the terms of the contract of transportation. The Board may,
by a ruling such as this, amend the conditions of thousands of
contracts already fully performed. On the other hand, if Judge
Frank is correct, the question of the reasonableness of a rule
already filed would be submitted to the Board only if the
complainant expected to be affected by the rule sufficiently often
in the future to justify the expense of a proceeding before the
Board. Persons in the position of the plaintiffs in these cases would
hardly press their complaints before the Board in return for the
dubious satisfaction of seeing that no one else was aggrieved by
the rule in the future.
With respect to the Cackette case, it is suggested that the differ-
ence in the language of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Civil
Aeronautics Act makes it unsatisfactory authority for the proper
contents of an air carrier tariff. As has been pointed out, that case
asserted that a tariff is merely a system of rates and charges, and
only matters directly related to such rates and charges may be
included therein. This would appear to be a correct definition of a
railroad tariff, but a comparison of Section 6 (1) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act - the Section requiring the filing of a "sched-
ule of rates, fares and charges" -with Section 403 (a) of the
Civil Aeronautics Act makes it clear that the Congress contem-
plated something broader with regard to air carriers. The lan-
guage of the first sentence of the Section of the earlier act is fol-
lowed in the later, but to that first sentence the provision is added
"4... and showing to the extent required by regulations of the
Board, all classifications, rules, regulations, practices and serv-
ices in connection with such air transportation."
It has been argued that Section 403 (a) and the Board's Eco-
nomic Regulations - referring specifically to Section 221.4 -
permit a rule to be filed only if it affects rates or services under
1953]
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such rates.4 Had this been the intent of Congress, however, it
would hardly have been necessary to add anything to the language
of the Interstate Commerce Act, for the Cackette case gets the
same definition out of the language of the earlier statute. Further.
more, the courts have not applied such a limited definition to air
carrier tariffs. It can hardly be argued that the right to cancel
flights because of weather affects the fares charged the passen-
gers on those flights; yet that right was upheld as a proper "prac-
tice" in the Jones, Mack and Adler cases.
CONCLUSION
The generally accepted rule would seem to be that, with regard
to the contents an air carrier's tariff, the courts may determine
whether the tariff has been violated and also whether material in
the tariff is authorized by statute to be included therein, but that
the courts will refer to the Civil Aeronautics Board questions of
the reasonableness of the contents. The Board, despite some judi-
cial opinion to the contrary, considers that it may find that the
contents of a tariff filed with it have never been reasonable and
hence have never been effective.
The language of the Civil Aeronautics Act regarding the filing
of tariffs indicates that it was contemplated that air carrier tariffs
would be broader in scope than railroad tariffs, but that such
increase in scope would be controlled by regulations of the Board.
To date the regulations promulgated by the Board do not give a
clear indication of just what "classifications, rules, regulations,
practices, and services in connection with such air transportation"
may properly be included in these tariffs.
It is suggested that the Board could eliminate a great deal of
the uncertainty which presently exists by providing adequate regu.
lations under Section 403 (a) of the Act, and that, whether it or
48 McKay, Airline Tariff Provisions as a Bar to Actions for Personal Injuries, 18 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 160 (1950).
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Judge Frank be right with regard to the retroactive effect of its
findings of unreasonableness, it could eliminate much uncertainty
on the part of carriers and their customers by determining the
reasonableness of tariff provisions when they are filed.
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